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11 Introduction
Recent discussions of exchange rate determination have increasingly emphasized the possible
role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in inﬂuencing exchange rate behavior. Yet, there are
few existing models of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and endogenous exchange rates.
T h i sp a p e rd e m o n s t r a t e st h a tt h ee n t r yd e c i s i o n so fM N E si n ﬂuence the volatility of the real
exchange rate in countries were there are signiﬁcant costs involved in maintaining production
facilities, even when prices are perfectly ﬂexible. For plausible parameterizations, MNE
activity can make the exchange rate more volatile than relative consumption.
In this paper we draw on three diﬀerent strands of international macroeconomics and
trade: (i) the role of returns on foreign direct investment and other assets in determining
the exchange rate; (ii) recent work on the behavior of heterogeneous exporters and MNEs;
and (iii) studies of the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle. In what follows, we discuss these
approaches in turn to highlight how they motivate and inform our approach.
It is well known that the volatility of the exchange rate is much higher than that of
other macroeconomic variables, such as the aggregate price level and consumption. This
produces a fundamental challenge for optimization-based open economy models that link
marginal rates of substitution to international goods prices. For instance, Baxter and
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) point out that nominal and real exchange rate
volatility is typically ten times higher than the volatility of relative prices and several times
times greater than the volatility of output or consumption. As demonstrated by Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), standard open economy business cycle models have diﬃculty
replicating these stylized facts unless implausible substitution elasticities are assumed. This
is due to the tight link between marginal rates of substitution and international relative
prices that are at the heart of optimization-based frameworks.
The exchange rate volatility puzzle is also related to, in the nomenclature of Rogoﬀ
(1996), the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. It stipulates that empirically exchange rates
appear to behave virtually independently of underlying economic fundamentals. Conse-
quently, the ability of modern open economy macroeconomics to explain exchange rate
m o v e m e n t sh a sb e e nn o tb e e na nu n q u a l i ﬁed success.1 We address this issue by approach-
ing exchange rate determination not from the goods side, but rather from a perspective of
ﬁnancial ﬂows generated by the operations of MNEs. This removes the burden of having
relative quantities match the volatility of relative prices.
Our argument — that aggregate consumption and prices appear to be much less volatile
than the exchange rate because their movement is dampened by the entry of less productive
1The seminal paper in this literature is Meese and Rogoﬀ (1985). Diﬀerent perspectives on this issue are
given by Clarida and Gali (1994) in a VAR framework, and Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) in an estimated
DSGE model.
2ﬁrms — is akin to a new vein of literature on the exchange rate disconnect puzzle empha-
sizing the role of transaction costs in trade. Fitzgerald (2005) shows both theoretically and
empirically that trade costs based on the geographic distance between countries can explain
why relative price levels are much less volatile than the real exchange rate, even when prices
are perfectly ﬂexible. Our paper abstracts from trade in goods, all local consumption being
produced by either domestic ﬁrms or resident branches of MNEs. It nonetheless approaches
the disconnect puzzle in a similar spirit, asking not why nominal and real exchange rates
are so volatile, but why they appear so volatile relative to consumption and relative price
levels. The excess volatility of the nominal exchange rate in this paper, reaching an upper
bound of 44 times that of consumption, can not attain the levels produced by recent models
of noise trading such as Xu (2005). This study simply brings to light a diﬀerent factor —
entry by heterogeneous ﬁr m s—w h i c hm a yg e n e r a t es o m ep o r t i o no ft h eo b s e r v e dd i s c o n n e c t
without sticky wages or prices.
In order to highlight the entry channel for exchange rate determination and to derive
(almost) closed-formed solutions, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we segment
markets by allowing no cross-border transfers of wealth via portfolio investment and we
shut down any real trade linkages, except for those involving the production and remittance
activities of multinational ﬁrms. These assumptions leave the nominal exchange rate com-
pletely determined by ﬂows of currency involved in paying local costs of production incurred
by overseas branches of MNEs and repatriating their proﬁts earned abroad. Foreign direct
investment, even in this model without sunk costs or physical capital, is the key driver of
real and nominal exchange rate movements. In this sense, the model draws on empirical
work by Gourinchas and Rey (2005), who uncover the interaction between returns on net
foreign assets, including foreign direct investment, and exchange rate behavior, as well as on
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004), who stress the potential role of foreign direct
investment as a factor inﬂuencing exchange rates.
Second, ﬁrms’ technology is characterized by heterogeneous labor productivity levels,
which inﬂuences the relative volatility of exchange rates, the aggregate price level, and
consumption arising in response to country-speciﬁc productivity shocks. A positive country-
speciﬁc productivity shock allows both native and foreign-owned ﬁrms with lower ﬁrm-
speciﬁc levels of productivity to become proﬁtable market participants. Lower idiosyncratic
labor productivity in these new entrants dampens the impact of the country-speciﬁcs h o c k
on total aggregate productivity. Thus, a positive productivity shock can impact the nominal
exchange rate at the same time entry by progressively less productive ﬁrms dampens the
eﬀect of the productivity shock on the aggregate price level and consumption.
This feature places the model in a new category of work uniting advances in trade the-
ory involving ﬁrm heterogeneity by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz
3(2003) with models of international ﬁnance. It does not involve the sunk costs or incomplete
asset markets that generate, respectively, endogenous persistence in exchange rate behavior
and a role for active monetary policy in the study of heterogeneous exporters and exchange
rates as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). However, it is rich enough to demonstrate that pro-
duction decisions by multinational ﬁrms can explain part of the diﬀerential in the variance
of exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables without nominal rigidities.
The rest of the paper considers the role that MNEs might play in explaining the discon-
nect puzzle. It begins by brieﬂy discussing current understanding about the relationship
between MNEs and exchange rate variability, as well as the importance of heterogeneity
amongst MNEs. Then, a simple, stylized model of multinational production is introduced
in Section 3, emphasizing the role of entry in determining the aggregate productivity level
and the number of diﬀerent goods available in the economy. The impacts of a shock to
Home technology on both nominal and real exchange rates, as well as on consumption and
the ratio of the Home and Foreign price level, are decomposed analytically and mapped
numerically in Section 4, followed by conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2 Exchange Rate Volatility and Foreign Direct Investment
The literature analyzing the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI is disperse
and at times conﬂicted, with no clear conclusion as to whether volatility will increase or
decrease FDI. Russ (2005) reconciles the conﬂicting empirical ﬁndings by demonstrating
that if exchange rates and demand for goods produced by MNEs are linked to common
macroeconomic variables, then the relationship between FDI and exchange rate volatility
will depend on the source of the volatilty. However, she stops short of considering the sort
of endogeneity that would arise if ﬂows of FDI directly inﬂuenced the supply and demand
for currency in foreign exchange markets.
Several papers indicate that investment activity by multinational ﬁrms and the returns
on this investment, in fact, are important in understanding exchange rate behavior and
should be integrated into models of the open economy. Aizenman’s (1992 and 1994) ground-
breaking portrayals of multinational ﬁrms with sticky wages depict a fully endogenous ex-
change rate that is impacted by supply and demand for multinational ﬁrms’ production,
with crucial implications for the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. Kosteletou and
Liargovas (2000) provide empirical evidence that inﬂows of FDI Granger-cause ﬂuctuations
in the real exchange rate for some European countries (Denmark, France, Greece, Portu-
gal, and Spain). Whether FDI generates appreciating or depreciating tendencies varies by
country, a disparity that the authors explain as emerging from each country’s use of the
inﬂows to ﬁnance either consumption or capital accumulation. Shrikhande (2002) builds a
4theoretical model that allows for cross-border acquisitions of physical capital. He is able
to replicate the observed persistence and time-varying volatility in the real exchange rate
using sunk costs in investment.
More recent work by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) suggests that FDI
can be an important determinant of exchange rate behavior insofar as it may act as the
source country’s collateral when borrowing from foreigners. Gourinchas and Rey (2005)
ﬁnd empirical evidence of a recursive relationship between exchange rates and the return
on net foreign asset holdings, including foreign direct investment. Cavallari (2005) argues
using a representative-ﬁrm framework that exchange rate overshooting may be generated
by repatriated proﬁts from multinational ﬁrms exploiting a positive productivity shock
overseas. The model below draws its motivation from this growing body of work stressing
the potential role of MNEs as one factor driving exchange rate ﬂuctuations, but adds the
additional consideration that entry by heterogeneous ﬁrms may dampen ﬂuctuations in
prices and consumption, making the exchange rate look more volatile in comparison.
There are important conceptual, empirical, and purely practical reasons for modeling
multinational ﬁrms characterized by heterogeneous productivity levels. First, it is diﬃcult
to explain why some ﬁrms — but not all — establish branches abroad, unless there exists
some diﬀerential in their potential to make a (nonnegative) proﬁt, which occurs when ﬁrms
have diﬀering labor productivity. Second, there are several stylized facts regarding micro
characteristics of MNEs that conﬂict with the representative ﬁrm assumption. Using an
extensive dataset that joins ﬁgures on ﬁrm size and employment with intra- and inter-
ﬁrm trade data, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2005) show that multinational ﬁrms are
larger in size and have greater revenues per worker than ﬁrms that do not show evidence of
having overseas aﬃliates. Modeling ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor productivity as Pareto-distributed
generates a pattern of ﬁrm sizes that is also Pareto, which reconciles with empirical ﬁndings
by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003). These stylized facts on ﬁrm size and distribution
are captured by the heterogeneous framework below.
Finally, introducting heterogeneity in the tradition of Melitz (2003) causes the entire
solution of the model to rest only on the lowest productivity level among ﬁrms producing in a
particular period and a set of exogenous parameters. Pinpointing this threshold productivity
level using a zero-cutoﬀ proﬁt condition allows the entire model to be solved numerically
without linearization and yields analytical results depicting the inﬂuence of shocks to a
country’s general technological state on the nominal and real exchange rate.
53 A Simple Model of Entry and FDI
3.1 The Consumer’s Problem








subject to the budget constraint:
PtCt + Mt = WtLt + Mt−1 + πt + Tt, (2)
and the cash-in-advance constraint:
PtCt ≤ Mt. (3)
Ct is aggregate consumption, Lt is labor input, Mt is the money stock; Wt is the nominal
wage, πt are ﬁrm proﬁts accruing to the household, and Tt are transfer payments from the
government; Pt is the aggregate price index, which we deﬁne below.
























with θ>1. The interval [0,n h,t) represents the continuum of all goods ch,t(i)t h a tc a n
possibly be produced by Home-owned ﬁrms for the Home market, and the interval [1,n f,t]
represents the continuum of all goods that can be produced by Foreign-owned ﬁrms, cf,t(i),
for the Home market (nh,t,n f,t ≤ 1). Furthermore, we assume that the cash-in-advance
constraint always binds. This determines aggregate consumption as a function of real
money balances, Ct = Mt
Pt .




and demand equations for individual goods produced by Home and Foreign ﬁrms that are
downward sloping in prices. Homothetic preferences imply that the demand for each good













3.2 The Firm’s Problem
In the Home and Foreign country, there is a continuum of entrepreneurs with plans to put
their particular invention into production. Each ﬁrm which decides to enter the market
during period t produces a unique good and has a ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity level, ϕ.T h i s
idiosyncratic component is distinct from the time-varying disturbance At, which denotes
the country-speciﬁc state of technology available to all ﬁrms operating in the Home country.
Technology is thus characterized by:
ch,t(i)=Atϕ(i)lh,t(i), (7)
where lh,t(i) is the amount of labor used by Home ﬁrm i f o rp r o d u c t i o ni nt h eH o m ec o u n t r y .
The country-speciﬁc productivity parameter for the Home country, At,i sd e ﬁned by
At =1+εt,
where εt = φεt−1 + υt,w i t hυt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε).
There is also a distribution of idiosyncratic productivity levels, g(ϕ), with support over
the interval (0,∞). Any diﬀerence among the pricing rules and production decisions of
ﬁrms operating in the Home country is due only to diﬀerences in ϕ. It is assumed that
g(ϕ) is a continuous distribution, so that the probability of two ﬁrms drawing the same
productivity level is zero and each ﬁrm will have a unique level of labor productivity. Thus,
ϕ is henceforth used to index each good and the ﬁrm which produces it, instead of the
general subscript i.2 Home ﬁr m so p e r a t i n gi nt h eH o m ec o u n t r ym a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts subject
to consumer demand. They also bear a ﬁx e do v e r h e a dc o s to fp r o d u c t i o n ,fh, denominated








2The continuous distribution is used because it allows this notational convenience. The modeling can
also be done with a discrete distribution and yield the same results.












T h ep r i c i n gr u l ec a nb ed e r i v e db ys u b s t i t u t i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h ed e m a n de q u a t i o ni n t o









i.e. ﬁrms set prices as a markup over marginal costs. The same process can be used to







(pf,t(ϕ)cf,t(ϕ) − Wtlf,t(ϕ) − Ptff).
Here, St is the nominal exchange rate at time t, measured in units of Home currency per
unit of Foreign currency. The term ff denotes the ﬁxed cost paid by Foreign-owned ﬁrms
operating in the Home currency, which may or may not be equal to the ﬁxed cost paid by
Home-owned ﬁrms, fh.T h eﬁxed cost is paid in the local currency of the host country — in
this case, the Home currency. It can be thought of as an overhead cost, or more abstractly
as the cost of capital with 100 percent depreciation. The pricing rule for Foreign goods
produced and sold in the Home currency turns out to be identical, since ﬁrms face the same


































More productive ﬁrms — those having a high level of labor productivity ϕ —w i l lc h a r g el o w e r
prices, sell more units, and earn higher revenues and proﬁts.
There is a continuum of prospective Home and Foreign entrepreneurs distributed over
[0,1) and [1,2], respectively, but only ﬁrms which can expect to be suﬃciently productive
to recoup the overhead cost will choose to produce in a particular period. Any ﬁrm may
enter, depending whether its total productivity, Atϕ, is high enough to result in revenues
suﬃcient to cover the ﬁxed cost. Let ηh,t(ϕ)a n dηf,t(ϕ) be the distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity levels observed among these active Home- and Foreign-owned ﬁrms. Then the
















































where α = θ
θ−1, the gross markup; Nt = nh,t + nf,t, the composite continuum of goods
available in the Home economy; and ¯ ϕt, the production-weighted average ﬁrm-speciﬁc level














3.2.1 The Zero-Cutoﬀ ProﬁtC o n d i t i o n
The lowest productivity level, ˆ ϕ,t h a ta l l o w saﬁrm to enter into production expecting
nonnegative proﬁts can be described using the Zero-Cutoﬀ Proﬁt (ZCP) condition. The
ZCPs for Home- and Foreign-owned ﬁr m so p e r a t i n gi nt h eH o m ec o u n t r ya r eg i v e nb y :




pf,t(ˆ ϕf,t)cf,t(ˆ ϕf,t) − Wtlf,t(ˆ ϕf,t) − Ptff
¢
=0 , (15)
respectively. Analogous expressions apply to entry in the Foreign market.
The ZCP conditions governing entry into the Home market reduce to functions of the
3See Melitz (2003) and Russ (2006), Section 2.4, for a discussion of the computation of the aggregate
price level and average ﬁrm-speciﬁc level of labor productivity.





















































Once g(ϕ) is speciﬁed, Eq. (16) is suﬃcient to pinpoint the minimum level of labor pro-
ductivity for Home ﬁrms entering the Home market. Note that the level of the Home (and
Foreign) money supply, M, does not appear in these equations. The money supply is com-
pletely neutral, as is common in ﬂexible-price frameworks. It does not aﬀect the threshold
level of productivity and therefore bears no inﬂuence on the entry behavior of ﬁrms. It is
used solely to specify the size of the market — necessary to discern the number of ﬁrms that
can enter — by limiting the maximum level of aggregate nominal expenditure. Furthermore,
the diﬀerence between the threshold productivity levels for Home- and Foreign-owned ﬁrms








As described in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) and Russ (2006), the equilibrium
distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity levels for ﬁrms owned by country j ∈ [h,f]c a n
now be characterized as truncated, so that ﬁrms with productivity levels too low to earn at
least zero proﬁts do not produce in period t.5 These low-productivity ﬁrms are plucked from









T h ea v e r a g ep r o d u c t i v i t yl e v e l si nt h eH o m e -a n dF o r e i g n - o w n e ds e c t o ro fb o t he c o n o m i e s —
and therefore the aggregate productivity and price levels, as well—are all functions of the
cutoﬀ productivity levels. Average productivity for j-owned ﬁrms operating in the Home















5See Appendix for proof of existence of ˆ ϕj,t.



















































It is assumed that the ﬁx e dc o s ti n v o l v e di np r o d u c t i o na b r o a di ss u ﬃciently large that a
ﬁrm producing abroad will always produce in its native country, as well (ˆ ϕ∗
f,t ≤ ˆ ϕf,t). Thus,
this benchmark model does not capture issues of geographic preference in ﬁrm location.
3.2.2 The Number and Size of Firms
It is important to stress that the threshold productivity levels directly determine the pro-
portion of prospective Home and Foreign entrants who actually undertake production in
the Home and Foreign markets. This proportion, denoted nj,t for ﬁrms owned by res-
idents of country j w h oe n t e rt h eH o m em a r k e t( j ∈ [f,h]),6 is simply the probability
that a ﬁrm holds an idiosyncratic productivity parameter greater than ˆ ϕj,t.S p e c i ﬁcally,
nj,t =1− G(ˆ ϕj,t). As ˆ ϕf,t increases, for instance, the proportion of Foreign-owned ﬁrms
entering the Home market falls. Such an increase means that a Foreign ﬁrm must have a
greater idiosyncratic level of labor productivity to expect to enter without incurring a loss.
Implicit diﬀerentiation of Eq. (16) (see the Appendix for explicit derivation) demonstrates
that
∂ˆ ϕj,t
∂At < 0: an increase in Home’s aggregate technology level makes it easier for both
Home- and Foreign-owned ﬁrms to produce proﬁtably for the Home market. More ﬁrms will
enter when At rises — both nh and nf will increase, as will the variety of goods available
in the Home market. If the size of the underlying pool of prospective entrants remains
constant, then the proportion of entrants can be interpreted loosely as the number of ﬁrms
and varieties in the market.7
6The proportion is denoted n
∗
j for those that enter the Foreign market.
7T h es i z eo ft h i su n d e r l y i n gp o o li sn o ts p e c i ﬁed in this model, nor do we consider the possibility that its
size may change in response to changes in technology, population, tax policy etc.
114 Productivity Shocks, Entry, and the Exchange Rate
4.1 Some Analytical Results
The foreign exchange market equilibrium requires that the number of units of Home currency
being oﬀered for exchange by overseas branches of Foreign multinationals repatriating their
proﬁts equal the number of units of Home currency demanded by overseas branches of Home
multinationals repatriating their own proﬁts. This condition is the multinational analog to













Equation (18) shows that the nominal exchange rate is entirely driven by the local costs
paid and revenues repatriated by the overseas branches of MNEs. Given the importance
of FDI in inﬂuencing the exchange rate here, it may seem objectionable not to model
capital expenditures more carefully than the simplistic repeated ﬁx e dc o s te n f o l d e di nt h e
proﬁt function. However, income earned by foreign branches of U.S. ﬁrms exceeded capital
outﬂows from the United States in the form of foreign direct investment in 2002 and 2003
(Lowe 2004, p.103),9 so it is not far-fetched to suppose that if the exchange rate is inﬂuenced
at all by foreign direct investment activity, it may be as heavily impacted by the repatriation
of net income as by capital expenditures.
The response of the nominal exchange rate to a positive country-wide shock to Home’s
productivity can be decomposed analytically into competing eﬀects. First, it is useful to
note that due to the segmented markets, i.e. goods can not be traded internationally,
the ﬂexible exchange rate, and the cash-in-advance constraint, there is no transmission of
productivity shocks across borders. Thus, the denominator in equation (18) will not move
when At changes. Second, using the implicit function rule, it is shown in the Appendix that
∂ˆ ϕj,t
∂At < 0, implying that the number of Foreign-owned ﬁrms producing in the Home market,
nf,t, increases in response to a positive innovation in Home technology. Then, it is left only
8See Russ (2006) for a derivation of the aggregation of proﬁts, also described in Melitz (2003).
9This has been the case even for US multinational activity in China (Mataloni 2004, p.24 and 25).


































































The top line in expression (19) manifests two ways that a positive shock to Home technol-
ogy increases the average proﬁts of Foreign-owned ﬁrms operating there. Both mechanisms
operate by making entry easier. They both reduce the ﬁxed cost ﬁrms must pay to produce
by pushing down the aggregate price level.11 The ﬁr s tt e r mi nt h et o pb r a c k e t sr e p r e s e n t s
the direct downward eﬀect that technology growth exerts on aggregate prices. This eﬀect
is obvious from the deﬁnition of the aggregate price level, Eq. (12), where all else equal, an
increase in At reduces Pt. The second term reveals an additional competitive eﬀect through
which entry pushes the aggregate price level down further than the change in At by itself.
T h eb o t t o ml i n ei nE q .( 1 9 )r e p r e s e n t st w od o w n w a r de ﬀects that entry exerts on the
revenues of the average Foreign-owned ﬁrm. First, it reduces the average idiosyncratic pro-









means lower variable proﬁts for the average Foreign ﬁrm. Second, because new entering
ﬁrms charge a higher price than existing ﬁrms due to their lower idiosyncratic productiv-
ity (generating higher marginal costs), they sell fewer units. Thus, the average ﬁrm now
operates on a smaller scale regardless of whether it is Home- or Foreign-owned. Unless
the burden of the ﬁxed cost is suﬃciently lowered by the drop in the aggregate price level
depicted in the top line of equation (19), a smaller scale for the average ﬁrm means lower
proﬁts for the average ﬁrm. These competing eﬀects on repatriated ﬁrm proﬁts and the
exchange rate are illustrated in more detail below.
4.2 Model Calibration and Baseline Numerical Results
We now proceed to analyse the model by assigning values to the parameters and comput-
ing the responses of selected variables to productivity shocks. The model’s calibration is
s u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e1 .
10See the Appendix for the derivation.
11This is because the ﬁxed cost is denominated in units of aggregate output, making the burden of paying
it depend on the price of a unit of the aggregate consumption bundle, Pt.
13Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
θ Substitution Elasticity 11
ρ Relative Risk Aversion 2
κ Labor Disutility 1
fh Home Fixed Cost 0.0182
ff Foreign Fixed Cost 0.0182
k Pareto Location 11
M Money Supply 100
φ AR(1) coeﬃcient 0.9
The ﬁxed costs are calibrated in this and the following sections such that 25% of prospec-
tive entrants from the Home and Foreign country decide to produce in the Home market.
B a s e do nt h ee m p i r i c a lﬁndings in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003) we model the distri-
bution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks as Pareto. The Pareto shape parameter for the
distribution of labor productivity levels, k, is chosen such that the index of ﬁrm dispersion
is as close to 1 as possible to ﬁt the range of estimates presented in Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2003) from a regression of ﬁrm size and rank.12
Our results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations the size of the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, ρ;t h eﬁxed costs; the relative disutility of labor, κ; and—since money is
completely neutral in this ﬂexible-price framework—the money supply, M. The elasticity
of substitution, θ, is chosen from a range of estimates in Feenstra (1994) and implies a
10% markup over marginal cost. Implications of higher markups (lower θ) are explored in
Section 4.3 below.
The benchmark results are reported in Figure 1. The variables shown are responding to
an exogenous 10% shock to Home’s country-speciﬁc productivity parameter, At. The jump
in Home’s aggregate productivity level (deﬁned as At¯ ϕt), however, is only 5.3%. This is
because the average ﬁrm-speciﬁc level of labor productivity, ¯ ϕt, actually falls more than 4%,
as the increase in At boosts the proﬁtability of ﬁrms with low idiosyncratic productivity,
enticing some of them to enter the Home market. Entry of ﬁrms that have lower ϕ than
existing producers lessens the eﬀect of the country-wide productivity shock on aggregate
12Firm size dispersion can be seen graphically by plotting the logarithm of the rank of each ﬁrm’s size in
comparison to all active ﬁrms against the logarithm of its size, with size measured in total sales. The slope
of this line represents the index of dispersion for ﬁrm size (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2003). A ﬂatter
line indicates higher dispersion. Firm size dispersion can also be deﬁned as the variance of ﬁrm size within
the population of active ﬁrms (Kremp and Mairesse, 1992).


















Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 10% increase in At - Baseline
productivity in the Home country. This is important because it is total productivity that
impacts the aggregate price level, Pt, and aggregate consumption, Ct. Since aggregate
productivity reﬂects only half of the country-wide productivity shock, the responses of Pt
and Ct are also muted.
Movement in the nominal exchange rate is one-and-a-half times as large as the response
in consumption, although it is still a bit smaller than the change in aggregate productivity.
Home’s nominal exchange rate appreciates (St falls) because Foreign ﬁr m sa saw h o l ea r e
repatriating less net proﬁt. The number of Foreign ﬁrms producing in the Home market
after the shock increases by 4%, so entry exerts some positive eﬀect on the amount of
proﬁt repatriated in terms of the sheer number of MNEs remitting income back to their
Foreign owners. However, the reduction in the average idiosyncratic productivity and scale
of the average Foreign-owned ﬁrm operating in the Home market causes the level of proﬁt
repatriated by the average ﬁrm to drop by over 9%. The net impact is a 4.7% appreciation of
Home’s nominal exchange rate.13 The Home price level also falls, acting as a counterweight
to this ﬂuctuation in the nominal exchange rate and subduing the response of the real
exchange rate to the Home technology shock; the real exchange rate falls only 1.4%.
13Since St is measured in units of Home currency per unit of Foreign currency, a decrease reﬂects an
appreciation of the Home currency.


















Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a 10% increase in At - Fixed Cost Shock
4.3 Technology Shocks and the Fixed Cost of Production
The innovation in productivity considered so far is a very speciﬁct y p eo fs h o c k ,a ﬀecting
only labor productivity in the Home country. Such a shock generates entry eﬀects only
indirectly, through its inﬂuence on the nominal value of the ﬁxed cost, Ptff. Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Martin (2005) point out that a shock to the size of the ﬁxed cost of production,
as occurs in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), yields a more direct eﬀect, since it alters the size of
this barrier to entry which acts as the primary limiting factor in determining the number
of ﬁrms. Redeﬁning the ﬁx e dc o s ts u c ht h a tp r o ﬁts for ﬁrms owned by country j ∈ [f,h]
operating in the Home market are given by:
πj,t(ϕj,t)=pj,t(ϕj,t)cj,t(ϕj,t) − Wtlj,t(ϕj,t) −
Ptfj
At
boosts the sensitivity of the real and nominal exchange rates to innovations in Home tech-
nology At, but diminishes the response of consumption and the price level.
Figure 2 and Table 2 show that the nominal and real exchange rates fall more than 13%,
while consumption rather surprisingly responds with a miniscule drop to the positive shock
to Home technology. How can this happen? The response of aggregate consumption/output
is sluggish because a dramatic increase in ﬁrm entry (15%) eats away the entire impact of
the technological innovation on aggregate productivity, which actually drops 3% after a
1610% increase in At. Moreover, the large number of new ﬁr m se x e r t sac o m p e t i t i v ee n t r y
eﬀect that erodes the market share of the average Foreign ﬁrm in the Home country by 27%
which, in combination with the lower-productivity of new entrants, diminishes the proﬁts
repatriated by the average Foreign ﬁrm by almost a quarter and total repatriated proﬁts
by 13%. Thus, total proﬁts repatriated to the Foreign country, the principal driver of the
nominal exchange rate, fall dramatically relative to consumption, despite the increase in
the number of Foreign ﬁrms operating overseas. Finally, the subdued response of aggregate
productivity generates only a one percent drop in the Home aggregate price level, allowing
the nominal appreciation to spur a large real appreciation, as well. In this case, exchange
rate volatility is about 44 times greater than the volatility of Home consumption.
4.4 Exchange Rate Volatility and the Markup
The degree to which entry mitigates movements in prices and consumption relative to the
nominal exchange rate in this model of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms depends on the
markup. As discussed above, progressively less productive new entrants lower the average
idiosyncratic labor productivity among producers, which smothers the increase in aggregate
productivity and the reduction in the price level that follows a country-wide productivity
s h o c k .H o w e v e r ,e n t r yb yn e wﬁrms also introduces a downward competitive eﬀect on prices,
even if they are a bit less productive than existing ﬁrms. When markups are high, many
more new ﬁrms have the opportunity to produce proﬁtably following a positive country-wide
productivity shock than when markups are low. A high markup creates a competitive eﬀect
on prices large enough to outweigh the drop in the average idiosyncratic productivity level,
¯ ϕ. Thus, Figure 3 shows that when the elasticity of substitution between goods is quite low
(about 2), the Home-speciﬁc technology shock induces much less dramatic ﬂuctuations in
the real and nominal exchange rate relative to consumption, even when the technological
innovation is applied to the ﬁxed cost, as in Section 5.2.
The proportion of entrants increases by almost 30 percent, which drives the price level
down by about 26%. Even though the plummeting price level boosts consumption by 35%,
the competitive eﬀects from entry reduce the Home market share of the average Foreign-
owned ﬁrm by a whopping 65%. This large competitive eﬀect squeezes proﬁts such that
the nominal exchange rate falls as well, by 40%. The competitive eﬀect is much larger
here than the previous example, where the shock structure is identical but the elasticity of
substitution is 11. The high elasticity of substitution lowers proﬁt margins and slows the
the increase in entry, so that changes in the number of entrants and proﬁt margins are only
half as large as when the elasticity is 2. It is worth noting here that although g(ϕ), the
underlying distribution of labor productivity levels, remains the same as in the previous
two sections for this third experiment, changing the elasticity of substitution, θ,a l t e r st h e
















Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a 10% increase in At - Low Substitutability
dispersion of ﬁrm size. Nonetheless, the results in this section remain qualitatively the
same, even if k is also changed to preserve the degree of ﬁrm dispersion.
Table 2 presents a comparison of the results for all three experiments. Exchange rate
volatility is highest relative to that of consumption, output, and the price level when
country-wide productivity shocks impact not only labor productivity, but also the ﬁxed
cost of production, fj (j =[ f,h] ) . T h i si st h ec a s eb e c a u s er e d u c t i o n si nt h eﬁxed cost
of production have a stronger impact on the number of producers than increases in labor
productivity. Since each additional ﬁrm is a bit less productive than the last, the entry
counteracts the impact of the country-wide shock on total aggregate productivity in the
economy. When consumers are very price-responsive and less willing to substitute away
f r o mc h e a p e rg o o d sf o rt h es a k eo fe n j o y i n gm o r ev a r i e t y ,a si st h ec a s ew h e nθ =1 1 ,t h e
entry is just enough to dampen the response of the aggregate price level and consumption to
the country-wide productivity shock. Because entry has a more dramatic eﬀect on market
share, it has a bigger impact on proﬁts repatriated by foreign ﬁrms, which drive the real
and nominal exchange rate. The net eﬀect is nominal and real exchange rates that are much
more volatile than consumption.
Entry responds most dramatically, and both market share and proﬁt margins are squeezed
18Table 2: Numerical Results
10 %. increase in At
L a b o rp r o d .o n l y L a b o rp r o d .a n dfj Labor prod. and fj
θ =11 θ =11 θ =2
Percentage Change:
Nt 4.9 15.4 30.0
ˆ ϕj,t -0.4 -1.3 -2.4
At¯ ϕt 5.3 -3.5 -25.8
Pt -3.0 0.3 -25.8
Ct 3.1 -0.3 34.7
cf,t(¯ ϕf,t)
Ct -10.0 -27.0 -65.0
¯ πf,t(¯ ϕf,t) -9.1 -25.0 -53.3
St -4.7 -13.4 -39.4
StP∗
t
Pt -1.7 -13.7 -18.3
Rel. Volatility:
σrer
σc 0.6 45 0.7
σs
σc 1.6 44 1.7
19the most when the elasticity of substitution is low. A low elasticity allows a high markup,
inviting opportunistic ﬁrms with much lower idiosyncratic productivity (and higher prices)
to enter into production and yielding an enormous downward eﬀect on total aggregate pro-
ductivity. However, the ﬂood of new producers in combination with consumers eager for
variety produces a ﬁerce competitive eﬀect, despite the high markups, demonstrated by
plunging market shares for Foreign-owned ﬁrms (
cf,t(¯ ϕf,t)
Ct ). Repatriated proﬁt s ,a sw e l la s
the level of the nominal exchange rate, plummet. But amidst the intense competition, the
aggregate price level falls as well, so that consumption responds almost as strongly as the
nominal exchange rate and considerably more than the real exchange rate, since the real
exchange rate is tempered by the change in the Home and Foreign relative price levels.
Thus, the net eﬀect of conﬂicting impacts from falling average idiosyncratic productivity
and increasing competitive pressures depends not only on the speciﬁcation of the technology
shocks, but also on consumer preferences.
5 Conclusion
The results from this stylized model of multinational ﬁrms suggest that entry decisions by
heterogeneous ﬁrms may partly explain why cross-country consumption ratios are observed
to be much less volatile than real and nominal exchange rates, even when prices are perfectly
ﬂexible. It does not strive to replace, but complement explanations in other studies, such
as sticky goods prices, varying trade costs, and noise trading in foreign exchange markets.
The basic intuition underlying the results is that under reasonable parameter choices, entry
by less productive ﬁrms may dampen the eﬀect of country-wide technological innovation
on aggregate prices and consumption, while generating larger movements in nominal and,
under some circumstances, real exchange rates as the amount of net revenues repatriated by
multinational ﬁrms ﬂuctuates. It is noteworthy that the larger the entry eﬀect, the greater
the response of the nominal and real exchange rate will be relative to the response of prices
and consumption when country-speciﬁc technology shocks occur, though the relationship is
weaker when demand is inelastic.
Allowing only multinational ﬁr m sa n dn ot r a d ei ng o o d s ,t h em o d e lh e r em a yb ec o n s i d -
ered to embody inﬁnitely high trade costs. Its results would likely be mitigated by allowing
traded goods, as in work by Bergin and Glick (2003) and Naknoi (2006) on endogenous
tradability. If either Home- or Foreign-owned ﬁrms operating in the Home country were al-
lowed to supply the Foreign market, depending on the size of trade costs, the Foreign price
level may also fall after a positive innovation in Home-speciﬁc technology. In this context,
an extension of the model allowing for goods trade may correspond with the ﬁndings of
Fitzgerald (2005), which indicate that high real exchange rate volatility is most likely to
20emerge between countries with high bilateral trade costs.
Another drawback of the model is that persistence in exchange rate movements arises
only from persistence in the exogenous productivity shock. Shrikhande (2002) shows that
explicitly adding capital with partial depreciation could produce endogenous persistence,
as the number of ﬁrms entering would become a state variable rather than a jump variable.
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) generate endogenous persistence in the real exchange rate using
a one-time sunk cost of entry. Nonetheless, using a simple model, this study carries
the important message that if the production and investment decisions of multinational
ﬁrms are considered as a factor driving exchange rate behavior, then heterogeneous labor
productivity among ﬁrms may explain part of the excess volatility observed in both the
nominal and real exchange rate, particularly when technological innovation directly reduces
barriers to entry.
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23Appendix
AT h e E x i s t e n c e o f ˆ ϕj,t
The cutoﬀ level of productivity for a ﬁrm owned by country j (j ∈ [f,h]) can be found
using the zero-cutoﬀ proﬁt condition:
πj,t(ˆ ϕh,t)=pj,t(ˆ ϕj,t)cj,t(ˆ ϕj,t) − Wtlj,t(ˆ ϕj,t) − Ptfj =0
Substituting the (rearranged) pricing rule and the speciﬁcation for production technology
yields









pj,t(ˆ ϕj,t)cj,t(ˆ ϕj,t)=θPtfj. (20)
Substituting the pricing rule, demand equation, and wage relation and rearranging,
equation (20) can be written as
































ϕθ−1g(ϕ)dϕ and α = θ−1
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Then, to prove the existence of ˆ ϕj,t,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that Zj,t is monotonic in ˆ ϕj,t.
Zj,t is, in fact, monotonically increasing in ˆ ϕj,t.T h e c a s e o fˆ ϕh,t is shown below and the


























for all ˆ ϕh,t, ˆ ϕf,t > 0.
24B The Impact of an Increase in At on Entry
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C The Impact of an Increase in At on Repatriated Proﬁts for
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